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Abstract 
Why do almost all sovereign nations list their international bonds on stock exchanges? 
We provide the first comprehensive report on sovereigns’ listing patterns for the entire post-
World War II period, and examine several hypotheses for what drives sovereigns to list and 
where. In particular, we test whether stock exchanges perform a certification and monitoring role 
for sovereign debt, and find little support for this “bonding hypothesis” today: we find no 
consistent association between the exchange chosen for a sovereign-bond issue and its yield. In 
contrast, we argue that sovereign-bond listings are primarily a form of regulatory arbitrage. 
There is a widespread belief in the sovereign-debt market that certain investors can invest in 
foreign securities only if they are listed on an exchange. Sovereigns are thus incentivized to list 
their bonds, but to seek out the least restrictive exchange that qualifies, triggering a race to the 
bottom among exchanges. We conclude that sovereign-bond listings no longer add value for 
investors. 
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1. Introduction 
Apart from a handful of the highest-quality issuers, sovereign nations all choose to list 
their international bonds on one of the prominent international stock exchanges. Yet little is 
known about where they list and why they do so. Sovereign listings present a puzzle, because 
international sovereign bonds are very rarely traded on their listed exchange, and stock 
exchanges would seem to have little ability to enforce investors’ interests against sovereign 
nations. To investigate this puzzle, we constructed what we believe is the largest dataset on 
sovereign-bond listings, covering the entire post-World War II period. We hypothesize that 
sovereign listings are primarily a form of regulatory arbitrage: sovereigns list solely to satisfy 
possible investor requirements for listed securities, and thus gravitate toward the international 
exchanges that offer the cheapest, fastest, and least burdensome listing process. 
This finding is in direct contrast to the dominant explanation in the financial and legal 
literatures for why issuers list securities on a foreign stock exchange. The bonding hypothesis 
points to the purported certification and monitoring roles played by major stock exchanges for 
foreign issuers (Coffee, 1999).1 By listing on a major foreign stock exchange, the theory goes, an 
issuer bonds itself to honor its implicit and explicit commitments to security holders. The notion 
is that complying with the listing standards set by the exchange sends a credible signal to the 
market of the issuing firm’s quality and serves to control moral hazard. As a historical matter, 
exchange listing appears to have been a crucial signal of credibility for sovereigns as early as the 
1800s, when the London Stock Exchange attracted the bulk of sovereign debt issuances and 
maintained a reputation for rigorously policing issuers (Wright, 2012; Flandreau, 2013). 
Institutions through which issuers can signal credibility have long been considered especially 
important in the sovereign context, because of the difficulty investors face in using more 
conventional methods of legal enforcement (Flandreau and Flores, 2009; Panizza et al., 2009). 
The theory that exchanges might play this credibility enhancing role has not been tested in the 
modern era of sovereign debt, however.   
If the bonding hypothesis holds, listing on one of the major global exchanges should 
lower the yield at issuance on a particular sovereign’s foreign bonds, all else equal. In practice, 
however, there are considerable obstacles to testing for this yield effect directly. Comparing the 
                                                     
1 Indeed, the fact that the most credible and established sovereigns do not list their bonds on any 
exchange, while all others choose to do so, plausibly suggests that listing may provide a credibility signal 
to investors. 
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bond yields of those sovereigns that list and those that do not would be inconclusive, because the 
very small subset of elite sovereigns that forgo listing—including the United States, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Australia—differs markedly from all other 
sovereigns in credit risk and other characteristics that primarily determine bond yields. 
Comparing the foreign-listed bonds and the domestically-listed or unlisted bonds of the very 
same sovereigns also proves problematic. In general, there are key contractual and other 
differences between a sovereign’s foreign bonds, which are expected to be traded internationally 
and listed on a foreign exchange, and its local bonds, which are primarily held by domestic 
investors and either unlisted or listed on the issuer’s domestic exchange (Bradley et al., 2016; 
Chamon et al., 2014), making it difficult to isolate the particular effect of listing on such bonds’ 
yields. Further, the bonding benefits (if any) of a sovereign’s listed bonds should also inure at 
least in part to the holders of its unlisted bonds. 
Rather than examining the choice to list or not, therefore, our empirical tests focus 
instead on a sovereign’s choice among the various global exchanges, once the decision to list has 
been made. Specifically, we test whether there are differences in bond yields across the different 
exchanges themselves, controlling for various issuer and bond-level characteristics. If the 
bonding hypothesis holds, we would expect some degree of sorting of sovereign issuers across 
the exchanges by quality and credibility, due to differences in the exchanges’ listing standards, 
their reputation for monitoring issuers, and any laws in the jurisdiction applicable to sovereign 
bonds.2 Such differences in the strength of the signal provided by the issuer should thus give rise 
to differences in yield, all else equal, which would not be eliminated by arbitrage.3 The exchange 
requiring the greatest degree of bonding should be associated with the lowest yields, and so on, 
similarly to the predictions for cross-listing firms (Coffee, 1999) and for domestic firms choosing 
from among local exchanges of varying stringency (Campbell and Tabner, 2014). In fact, 
                                                     
2 In some jurisdictions such as the United States, by listing on an exchange the issuer becomes bound not 
only by the exchange’s rules and listing standards, but also by the country’s securities laws. Thus, the 
credibility afforded by the exchange listing could stem in part (or primarily) from that jurisdiction’s 
background law. Even in such jurisdictions, however, sovereigns tend to be largely exempt from 
securities regulations such as disclosure requirements. 
3 Even if all issuers could potentially satisfy the requirements of the strictest exchange, for example, the 
lowest-quality sovereigns (those most susceptible to moral hazard, for example) should find it the 
costliest to do so, leading to the self-sorting of issuers by exchange (Doukas and Hoque, 2016). Our 
empirical test therefore assumes (1) that investors cannot perfectly observe a sovereign issuer’s quality 
and (2) that the costs and benefits of listing vary in some way with the issuer’s unobservable quality.  
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however, we find little evidence to support the bonding hypothesis in today’s sovereign-bond 
market: none of the major jurisdictions is consistently associated with a significant yield 
differential.   
We confirm this result with a review of the top exchanges’ listing requirements and 
responses from forty-four elite lawyers involved in international sovereign-debt work. We find 
that, contrary to the bonding hypothesis, the top listing jurisdictions for sovereign bonds compete 
primarily on the ease and speed with which they grant listing approvals. For nearly thirty years, 
the Luxembourg Stock Exchange has been the overwhelming favorite among the global 
exchanges for international sovereign-bond offerings. Most recently, we find that the Irish Stock 
Exchange has been rapidly gaining market share. Yet the popularity of Luxembourg and now 
Dublin fits poorly with a bonding story. Both jurisdictions are characterized by the near absence 
of substantive listing standards and enforcement for sovereigns. While Ireland first gained 
market share as the jurisdiction of choice for first-time, low-rated sovereigns, it now attracts a 
wide range of issuers, by explicitly marketing itself as the fastest jurisdiction for listings. In 
practice, the only hurdle to obtaining a sovereign-bond listing in any of the top jurisdictions is 
the payment of a modest fee. Thus, the lack of observable yield differentials between the various 
exchanges is likely best explained by the fact that none of them actually performs a screening or 
monitoring function. 
Yet if listing does not increase a sovereign’s credibility with investors, we are left with 
the original puzzle of why sovereigns choose to list at all. We hypothesize that sovereign listings 
are primarily a form of regulatory arbitrage, driven by a hodge-podge of investment restrictions 
across the globe that may cause certain investors to favor listed securities, regardless of the 
exchange’s jurisdiction. Such restrictions—or the mere belief in their existence—prompt 
sovereigns to list on the fastest, cheapest, and most permissive exchange that qualifies, which in 
turn induces a race to the bottom among the exchanges.  
The policy implications are significant: if this explanation is correct, the practice of 
listing sovereign bonds abroad is merely a costly response to investment restrictions that, in the 
absence of any bonding effect from listings, no longer serve an obvious purpose. While the 
major securities exchanges have historically served a crucial private ordering function, this role 
has largely dissipated in today’s sovereign-debt market. 
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The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Part 2 surveys the relevant literatures on 
the motivations for exchange listings. Part 3 details the construction of our data set and provides 
key descriptive facts about sovereigns’ listing patterns over time. Part 4 reports test results. Part 
5 discusses alternative explanations for the current listing patterns.  Part 6 concludes. 
 
2. Prior Literature 
Recent research in law and finance focuses on the price impact of specific contractual 
terms and other features of sovereign bonds, such as collective action clauses (e.g., Becker et al., 
2003; Gugiatti and Richard, 2003; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000 and 2004; Bradley and Gulati, 
2013) and governing law (e.g., Choi et al., 2011; Clare and Schmidlin, 2014; Chamon et al., 
2014).  We examine the price impact of a sovereign’s choice of exchange on which to list its 
international (or foreign) bonds—that is, sovereign bonds intended for foreign investors. 
Sovereign issuers may choose from a wide range of international or local exchanges, which can 
vary in terms of listings standards, monitoring and enforcement, applicable law, trade volume, 
fees, and ease and speed of the approval process. Whether to list and where are among the key 
decisions that sovereigns must make at the outset when issuing bonds.   
Although the practice of listing international sovereign bonds is nearly ubiquitous, to our 
knowledge no prior literature addresses for the modern era why sovereign issuers choose to list 
their bonds on an exchange, where they choose to list, or how those choices have evolved over 
time. While there is a long literature on the historic roles played by stock exchanges (e.g., 
Mahoney, 1997; Macey and O’Hara, 2002), the specific context at issue involves issuers listing 
their securities on an exchange in a foreign jurisdiction. The most analogous literature concerns 
the practice of “cross-listing,” in which non-U.S. firms whose stock is listed on a domestic 
exchange choose to obtain a secondary listing on one of the major U.S. stock exchanges such as 
the NYSE or Nasdaq (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 1999 and 2002). The cross-listing inquiry has 
spawned a long empirical and theoretical literature in corporate finance, yielding two major 
hypotheses to explain the practice. 
First, under the bonding hypothesis, cross-listing amounts to a firm’s pledge of “good” 
behavior toward investors (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 1999; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge et al., 
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2004).4 By listing on an exchange, the firm commits to abiding by the exchange’s rules and 
listing standards, and in many cases the securities laws of the relevant jurisdiction. Together, 
these may require substantial disclosure by the firm (including in particular audited financial 
statements and discussion of material conflicts of interest), as well as compliance with 
substantive corporate governance requirements. Listing on a reputable foreign stock exchange 
can thus send a credible signal to the market of the issuing firm’s quality and serve to control 
moral hazard.   
Second, the market segmentation hypothesis (or liquidity hypothesis, as we will refer to 
it), posits that investment markets are (or were) segmented worldwide by regulatory restrictions, 
transaction costs, and information problems, all of which burden cross-border investing (e.g., 
Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977; Errunza and Losq, 1985). By secondarily listing its stock 
on a U.S. exchange, for example, a foreign firm might better access the liquidity provided by the 
massive U.S. investor base.   
Empirical studies of cross-listing have found support for both hypotheses (e.g., Foerster 
and Karolyi, 1999; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge 2004, Doidge et al. 2009), though the 
most recent studies (described in Karolyi, 2012; see also Doukas and Wang, 2014) suggest that 
they may be losing some explanatory force in a world of declining barriers to international 
investing and more integrated capital markets. As with cross-listing firms, sovereigns might 
select particular foreign stock exchanges on which to list their bonds in order (1) to provide an 
ongoing signal of credibility to investors (the bonding hypothesis) or (2) to better access foreign 
investors (the liquidity hypothesis). In the sovereign-debt context, only the bonding hypothesis 
has figured prominently in the literature, and only with respect to pre-War periods. In the 1800s, 
for example, sovereign issuers flocked to the London Stock Exchange, which developed a 
reputation for promptly delisting any sovereign that defaulted on its bonds (Wright, 2012; 
Flandreau, 2013). This would have effectively cut off the affected sovereign’s access to 
international investors, thus providing strong ex ante incentives for issuers to avoid defaulting. 
                                                     
4 Specifically, the cross-listing literature focuses on the role played by a foreign (in this case, U.S.) 
exchange listing in reducing management and controlling shareholder agency costs.  In this view, firms in 
jurisdictions with weak disclosure requirements and protections for minority shareholders can plausibly 
lower their cost of capital by listing secondarily in stricter jurisdictions, with the secondary listing(s) 
serving as a bonding mechanism for the firm. 
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We test the bonding hypothesis in Part 4 using our sample of international sovereign-bond 
issues; Part 5 discusses the liquidity hypothesis. 
In the lone prior empirical study of sovereign bonds that takes into account listings, 
Bradley et al. (2016) examine the effect on yield at issuance of a sovereign’s decision to issue 
bonds under “local” versus “foreign” parameters, including governing law, currency, and listing 
jurisdiction. The authors do not find a consistent effect on yield from listing on a foreign 
exchange versus a local one. Under specifications that appear to show that foreign listings are 
significantly associated with a reduction in yield, the effect appears to be driven by the more 
salient “foreign” parameters of currency and governing law, with which foreign listings are 
highly correlated. By combining all of the different foreign exchanges into a single category, 
Bradley et al. (2016) do not inquire whether there are differences among the exchanges that 
might entail differences in the degree to which they can perform a bonding role, if at all. 
 
3. Description of Data 
3.1 Construction of dataset 
Our data consist of 5,896 bond issuances by national sovereigns from 1945 through 2015, 
representing what we believe to be the most comprehensive dataset of sovereign bonds to date 
for the post-World War II period. Issuances prior to 1980 were coded entirely by hand from the 
offering circulars or prospectuses for available sovereign debt offerings.5 The documents were 
obtained directly from the major exchanges themselves (including the London Stock Exchange, 
the New York Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange), from the archives of major banks that have underwritten sovereign debt, museums, 
university and other private collections, and records kept by central banks (for Switzerland and 
Germany). Gaps remain in the data, however, as we were unable to obtain records from certain 
exchanges (including, notably, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange). Nonetheless, a substantial 
proportion of the bonds for this period have never been identified in prior literature (e.g., Bradley 
et al., 2016). 
                                                     
5 We rely on offering circulars and prospectuses for the bond terms, because in most cases we do not have 
access to the underlying bond contracts (the underwriting agreements or bond indentures).  We believe 
that such reliance is justified, given that market participants routinely do the same and that issuers and 
underwriters are potentially liable for inaccurate disclosures. 
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For issuances from approximately 1980 onwards, our dataset was constructed from both 
the Dealogic DCM Analytics database (which codes key characteristics of sovereign debt 
issuances, including the exchange listing) and from hand-coded bond prospectuses and offering 
circulars taken from two electronic databases, Thomson One Banker and Perfect Information.  
We report only on sovereign bonds listed on foreign securities exchanges, rather than on the 
issuer’s domestic exchange(s). (Foreign-listed bonds are especially important in the context of 
the bonding hypothesis, because foreign exchanges are presumably harder for sovereigns to 
capture than a local one would be.)  
Our set of issuers consists solely of national sovereigns, including central banks issuing 
on behalf of their national sovereigns, and we exclude instruments with a maturity of less than 
two years. For each issuance, we code basic terms of the bond contract and characteristics of the 
issuance, including the issue date, maturity date, yield at issuance, coupon rate, currency, 
principal amount, exchange listing, and governing law. Where the yield at issuance is 
unavailable, we assume that the bond was issued at par and thus use the coupon rate as a proxy. 
We further code the law firms representing the issuer and the underwriter, respectively, the lead 
underwriter, and the number of banks in the syndicate. Finally, we supplement our data with the 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term, foreign-currency debt ratings for each sovereign issuer at 
the time of the issuance. 
Overall, we compiled data on 5,523 bonds, using hand-collected information for 1,764 
bonds and relying at least in part on electronic databases for another 3,759 bonds. To minimize 
errors, we cross-checked multiple sources where available. Our final sample was constructed as 
follows. First, we dropped all bonds with no listing information, reducing our sample to 4,451. 
Second, we treated issuances that were simultaneously listed on multiple exchanges as separate 
issuances for each listing jurisdiction, increasing our sample to 4,824 bonds. Third, we dropped 
all bonds listed on the issuer’s domestic exchange, reducing our sample to 4,241 bonds. Finally, 
we dropped all bonds issued in connection with a sovereign-debt restructuring, because such 
bonds were unlikely to have been issued at market yields. To summarize, our final dataset 
comprises 4,231 sovereign bonds issued by 121 countries and listed on 24 foreign stock 
exchanges over a period of 70 years—from 1945 to 2015. Tables 1-4 provide summary statistics. 
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3.2 Growth of the overall market 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of sovereign-bond issuances listed on foreign securities 
exchanges over time. In the aftermath of World War II, activity in the sovereign bond market 
remained weak for over thirty years. From the 1980s onwards, however, foreign listings surged, 
prompted by the development of the Eurobond market and by the Brady Bonds issued to 
restructure the syndicated bank loans of various Latin American sovereigns.6  
 
Figure 1 further reveals that the practice of listing foreign bonds simultaneously on 
multiple exchanges became widely popular in the 1990s, but fell out of favor in the 2000s. 
 
Figure 1 Foreign sovereign bond listings, 1945-2015 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
6 Prior to that time, sovereign debt primarily took the form of syndicated bank loans. 
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3.3 Foreign listings occur in waves 
Figure 2 displays the share of aggregate bond issuances in each year of each of the top 
ten international exchanges for sovereign debt listings (Luxembourg, Germany, London, 
Switzerland, New York, Tokyo, Paris, Singapore, Dublin and Hong Kong), for the entire post-
World War II period.7 It reveals several major historical trends in sovereign debt listing patterns. 
First, and most dramatically, the dominant exchange for sovereign debt listings has shifted over 
time—from London, through World War I (as reported in Michie, 1999; Wright, 2012; 
Flandreau, 2013), to New York, to Luxembourg. Though it receives little mention in the 
literature, we find that New York held the majority of the market share for foreign sovereign 
debt listings for roughly the first thirty-five years after World War II (until approximately 1980), 
at which point Luxembourg steadily began to capture market share. By the early 1990s, 
Luxembourg was the dominant exchange and virtually no sovereigns continued to list in New 
York. Of the 331 sovereign bonds issued between 1945 and 1979, for example, 41% were listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange. In comparison, of the 3,816 sovereign bonds issued between 
1980 and 2015, only 36 (0.9%) were listed on the NYSE, while 2,172 (52%) were listed on the 
Luxembourg Stock Exchange. As of the writing of this paper, no sovereign nation has listed its 
bonds on the NYSE since Lebanon in 2005 and, prior to that, Uruguay in 1999. 
Also noteworthy in Figure 2 is that the shift to Luxembourg was not merely a shift away 
from New York, but away from the other leading listing jurisdictions at the time, such as 
Switzerland and Germany. In the 1980s, there was a distinct change in sovereigns’ listings 
preferences, which manifested in a widespread shift toward Luxembourg. Subsequently, and all 
the way up to the present day, Luxembourg has retained its leader status and has consistently 
held more listings than any of the other top five exchanges and Ireland (combined). 
                                                     
7 In the case of both Germany and Switzerland, the listing figures reported here represent aggregate 
listings across their respective regional stock exchanges.    
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Figure 2 Top exchanges: Share of listings by year (in %), 1945-2015 
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 Similarly, we find that Switzerland was one of the first jurisdictions to begin listing 
international sovereign bonds after World War II—including notably those of apartheid-era 
South Africa, beginning in 1952—but lost market share beginning in the 1980s. Currently, only 
three jurisdictions besides Luxembourg (Ireland, London, and Singapore) retain a material share 
of the market. 
 
Figure 3 reports by year the aggregate number of bonds listed on the top ten exchanges, 
assuming all listed bonds remain outstanding until maturity. We again observe Luxembourg 
becoming and remaining the dominant exchange throughout the 1980-2015 period, effectively 
eliminating all of its historical competitors other than London. Germany, for example, 
commanded a sizable market share of sovereign listings up to approximately 1990, after which it 
fell out of favor almost entirely, following the adoption of the Euro.8 Similarly, we find that 
Switzerland was one of the first jurisdictions to begin listing international sovereign bonds after 
World War II—including notably those of apartheid-era South Africa, beginning in 1952—but 
lost market share beginning in the 1980s. Currently, only three jurisdictions besides Luxembourg 
(Ireland, London, and Singapore) retain a material share of the market. 
 
Figure 3: Number of bonds currently listed per year, 1945-2015 
                                                     
8 The overall growth of the sovereign-debt market made evident by Figure 3 would be even more 
staggering if reported in inflation-adjusted dollars (rather than by number of issuances), since offerings 
have also increased dramatically in size over the sample period, from in the range of one hundred million 
dollars in the first thirty years of the market to multi-billion-dollar offerings in the current era. 
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New York’s decline as a listing jurisdiction coincides with the birth of the Eurobond 
market, which was expressly designed to allow non-U.S. issuers to avoid the regulatory burden 
of the U.S. securities laws while raising funds in dollars (Fuller, 2012). The first Eurobond issue 
in 1963, by the quasi-sovereign Autostrade, was listed on the London Stock Exchange but traded 
in several financial centers simultaneously, which became a key feature of Eurobonds. The 
Eurobond market is thus viewed as the first truly international capital market, in which the 
jurisdiction of the issuer and the investors, the listing exchange, the currency, and the trading 
venue(s) became increasingly independent from one another.    
To our knowledge, the literature is silent as to what prompted sovereign issuers to shift 
their listings to Luxembourg when the Eurobond market got its second wind in the 1980s. While 
Luxembourg is known as something of a tax haven for corporations within the EU, no such tax 
advantage applies to sovereign bonds, which in the case of Eurobonds have always paid gross 
interest (that is, without withholding tax on behalf of the issuer’s jurisdiction) regardless of the 
listing jurisdiction. Initially, there may have been advantages to listing in the same jurisdiction as 
the bonds’ clearing agent: one of the two major European clearing systems, Cedel (now 
Clearstream), was founded in Luxembourg in 1971. It appears that Luxembourg’s ascendancy as 
a listing jurisdiction for sovereign debt is attributable to a combination of chance and 
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opportunism. In discussions with senior officers of the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, we were 
told that the Exchange was first put on the map when major international and supra-national 
organizations began issuing there, by virtue of Luxembourg’s status as one of the seats of 
government for the European Economic Community. Thereafter, according to our panel of 
sovereign-debt lawyers, Luxembourg attracted listings simply by adopting significantly more 
permissive listing standards and charging lower fees than the other major exchanges at the time, 
a view that is at odds with the bonding hypothesis. 
 
3.4 The Preferences of Different Types of Issuers 
While the overall shifts from New York and other jurisdictions to Luxembourg are 
unmistakable, it is unclear from Figure 3 whether these shifts were distributed evenly across 
issuers of differing credit risk. Figure 4 depicts for each decade from 1960 onwards the relative 
market share of the top four exchanges and Ireland by category of Standard and Poor’s long-term 
foreign currency debt rating.9 (Although its market share over the full period is negligible, the 
Irish Stock Exchange is currently the fastest-growing exchange for new sovereign listings.10) 
 
                                                     
9 For this purpose, we aggregate the bond ratings into only seven categories (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, 
and CCC), folding in ratings categories with “pluses” and “minuses.” 
10 The Irish Stock Exchange (ISE) was simply a branch of the London Stock Exchange until 1995, when it 
began operating as an independent exchange.  The ISE listed its first international debt offering in 2000. 
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Figure 4: Share of listings on the top exchanges, by rating, 1960-2015 
  
Two phenomena stand out. First, the average quality of international sovereign debt 
issuances has declined significantly since 1960, when only top-rated (A to AAA) sovereigns 
listed on foreign exchanges. Today, the international market’s appetite for risk has increased 
significantly, with issuers of all categories of credit risk appearing on the major exchanges. 
Second, in recent decades there is no clear pattern of lower-rated and higher-rated issuers 
clustering in different exchanges. Luxembourg and London both attract issuers across a broad 
risk spectrum, while the increasingly popular Irish Stock Exchange currently appeals 
disproportionately to lower-rated issuers (as shown in the bottom right corner of Figure 4).11 
Because both high-quality and low-quality sovereign issuers have for the most part converged on 
Luxembourg, the indications are of a pooling rather than a separating equilibrium in sovereign 
debt listings, which is potentially in tension with the bonding hypothesis.  
 
3.5  The Decline of Multi-Listing 
                                                     
11 Prior to the 1990s, there was a relatively clear dichotomy.  In the post-War period, New York (until the 
early 1980s) followed by Luxembourg attracted the lowest quality (highest-yield) issuances.  By contrast, 
Switzerland was the exchange of choice for the highest-quality (lowest-yield) issuances until the mid-
1980s, at which point Luxembourg and London captured much of its market. 
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Returning to Figure 1, we observe another historical change in listing patterns for 
sovereign debt. For several decades during the post-War period, roughly 1975-2000, a number of 
sovereigns listed their bonds on not just one but multiple foreign exchanges. This was done in 
one of two ways. First, a sovereign could list the very same bond on multiple foreign exchanges 
simultaneously. In 1994, for example, Finland listed a U.S.-dollar bond simultaneously on the 
Luxembourg, Hong Kong, and Singapore exchanges. Second, a sovereign might issue multiple 
bonds on different exchanges over a relatively short period of time, generally according to the 
bonds’ currency. In the 1980s, for instance, Mexico repeatedly issued Swiss franc bonds on the 
Swiss exchanges, Peso-denominated bonds in Buenos Aires, and so forth.  Both such forms of 
multi-listing have virtually disappeared in the last decade. The practice today is to list bonds 
aimed at the international market on a single exchange (which, in turn, is most likely to be 
Luxembourg), regardless of the currency of issuance.  
The erstwhile phenomenon of multi-listing raises several possibilities. First, under the 
bonding hypothesis, subjecting oneself to the rules of not one, but multiple, foreign exchanges 
may have been viewed as a particularly credible signal of quality. In that case, the decline of 
multi-listing in favor of listing solely in Luxembourg could suggest either (1) that Luxembourg 
now lends issuers so much credibility that they no longer need to incur the expense and 
inconvenience of listing on multiple exchanges (a hypothesis that we reject in Part 4) or (2) that 
exchange listings today are no longer viewed as a signal of quality and good behavior, whether 
because the exchanges’ listing standards have declined by historical standards or because another 
institution such as the rating agencies emerged to provide a comparable function.  
Second, in a story more in line with liquidity enhancement than bonding, multi-listing 
may have been viewed as the best means of accessing investors in different jurisdictions. (A 
single sovereign listing otherwise identical bonds in different currencies on different exchanges 
(according to currency) appears more in keeping with the liquidity hypothesis than the bonding 
hypothesis.) If so, the decline of multi-listing suggests that barriers to cross-border investing 
have indeed lessened, whether through regulatory changes or private ordering. More broadly, the 
decline of multi-listing may have parallels to the recent decline in cross-listing by multinational 
firms: after a surge in foreign firms choosing to cross-list in the U.S. during the 1980s and early 
1990s, de-listings and de-registrations by foreign firms in the U.S. have outpaced new cross-
listing firms (Karolyi 2012). 
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4. Regression Analysis and Results 
4.1 Yield Spreads Model 
The choice of whether and where to list sovereign bonds is made prior to issuance, and is 
typically featured on the very first page of the bond prospectus or offering circular made 
available to investors. Thus, if sovereigns’ listing choices are motivated by bonding, we would 
expect the chosen exchange to affect the bonds’ yield at issuance, all else equal.12 For reasons 
discussed in Part 1, we test for differences in yield among bonds listed on the different major 
securities exchanges, rather than for differences in yield between listed and unlisted bonds.  
The ideal experiment would involve comparing the yields on bonds issued by sovereigns 
of identical observable credit risk, issued at precisely the same time and with identical contract 
terms and other features, but listed on different exchanges. In practice, however, we must rely on 
observational data with considerable heterogeneity in issuer and bond characteristics. Our sample 
of bond issuances covers a wide range of issuer credit ratings, issue dates, maturities, principal 
amounts, currencies, and contract terms, and we would expect each of these factors to have a 
greater effect on the yield at issuance than the choice of exchange. We are aided in our task, 
however, by the fact that, as shown in Part 3, even sovereigns that tend to list on a single 
exchange do occasionally switch to a different exchange (while their bond contracts and credit 
risk remain constant), and many sovereigns have chosen to issue on multiple different exchanges 
simultaneously or within a relatively short period of time.   
Using our sample of pooled cross-sectional data, we examine the effect of listing on a 
specific stock exchange on the sovereign’s cost of capital under the following model: 
 
ݕ௜௝ ൌ ߚଵܮܫܵܶܫܰܩ௜ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜ 
 
where each observation is a separate bond issue i by national sovereign j, the dependent variable 
is the spread between the yield at issuance of bond i and the yield on a U.S. Treasury bond with 
                                                     
12 This assumes, of course, that investors price the expected bonding benefits of an exchange listing. 
Although the market for international sovereign debt is dominated by large institutional investors, pricing 
is likely less efficient than in the market for corporate debt (e.g., Choi and Gulati 2016). In the absence of 
a price effect, however, bonding would not be a plausible motivation for listing. 
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the same maturity and issued on the same day (our proxy for the risk-free rate), and X is a vector 
of control variables described below.  
Our variables of interest are the nine indicator variables (LISTING) for each of the top ten 
listing jurisdictions over the full 1945-2015 period other than Luxembourg. Luxembourg is set as 
the base jurisdiction in the regressions. Thus, a positive (negative) coefficient on one of the 
LISTING variables indicates that the exchange is associated on average with a higher (lower) 
yield spread than Luxembourg, all else equal. We also report the F-statistics and corresponding 
p-values for the hypothesis that the coefficients on the LISTING variables are all equal to zero. 
Our regression sample is limited to post-1986 issuances—coinciding with the resurgence of the 
international sovereign-debt market—as we require a complete daily (interpolated) yield curve 
for U.S. Treasuries. This yields a final sample size of 4,226 issues. We exclude individual 
exchanges from any regression for which the exchange would have fewer than ten observations. 
 We include the following control variables to proxy for other factors affecting bond 
yields. As our primary control for observable credit risk, we include indicator variables for each 
S&P ratings category for issuers’ long-term foreign-currency credit risk. To control for other 
contract terms and bond features that should affect yield spreads but might not be fully captured 
in the credit ratings, we include the bond’s maturity/tenor, principal amount issued (natural 
logarithm), and governing law (following Bradley et al., 2016). To control for currency risk, we 
include indicator variables for each currency in the sample. Finally, we include the lagged 
CBOE’s volatility index (or VIX) to control for the fact that yield spreads vary over time due to 
global factors. In all of the specifications reported below, the coefficients on the S&P ratings 
categories were all significant and of the expected sign and relative magnitude. Standard errors 
are clustered at the issuer level. 
Table 5 reports the results of our OLS regressions for the full sample of sovereign-bond 
issuances, from 1986 through 2015. We consider different specifications, including a baseline 
OLS model, and OLS with issuer and/or year fixed effects. Using the full set of control variables 
(columns (4) through (7)), including in particular credit ratings, currency, and governing law, 
none of the coefficients for New York or the major European exchanges is significant at the 5% 
level. The lone exception (in column (5)) is Paris, which appears to provide on average a 51-
basis-point reduction in yield relative to listing in Luxembourg. Tellingly, however, Paris is no 
longer competitive today in attracting sovereign listings. The top Asian exchanges—Singapore, 
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Tokyo, and Hong Kong, do show significant coefficients under various specifications, but of this 
group only Singapore continues to attract new listings today. Neither of the current top 
jurisdictions (London and Dublin) is significant relative to Luxembourg at even the 10% level. 
Nonetheless, the F-test indicates that the coefficients on the top ten jurisdictions are jointly 
significant at the 5% level in all specifications other than columns (6) and (7), with the result 
likely driven by the Asian exchanges.  
Interpreting the results for a thirty-year sample poses certain conceptual difficulties. 
Table 6 reports the results of the same OLS regressions using separate subsamples for each 
decade. The results for the current decade (column (6)) show no significant effects on yield 
relative to Luxembourg from any of the other listing jurisdictions, and we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that all of the coefficients on the listing variables are equal to zero. In prior decades, 
Switzerland (in the 1980s) and Paris and Hong Kong (in the 1990s) are associated with 
significant reductions in yield relative to Luxembourg, potentially as a result of a bonding effect, 
but none of these jurisdictions retains meaningful market share today.  
Finally, Table 7 reports the results of the same OLS regressions, limited only to U.S.-
dollar and euro issuances, in order to rule out the possibility that inflation in the non-major 
currencies affected the results for the full sample. Once again, none of the coefficients on the 
listing variables is statistically significant at even the 10% level in the current decade (column 
(5)), with the notable exception of Singapore, which is associated with a large and significant 
reduction in yield. Using the full thirty-year sample (columns (1)-(4)), listing in New York is 
variously associated with a significant reduction in yield relative to Luxembourg. This result is 
striking: while the New York Stock Exchange may well have provided a bonding benefit in the 
past, it has been abandoned entirely by sovereign issuers for over a decade.   
4.2 Yield Premium Model 
OLS regressions using the full sample of sovereign-bond issuances have two limitations: 
(1) there is considerable heterogeneity across issuers, credit ratings, currencies, maturities, and 
issue dates; and (2) the listing variables are unbalanced, given Luxembourg’s dominant market 
share relative to any other individual listing jurisdiction, particularly in the current decade. In this 
section, we attempt to mitigate both concerns by estimating a model that groups bonds according 
to key parameters and uses the yield differential relative to Luxembourg-listed bonds as the 
independent variable.  
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We begin by grouping all bonds having the same credit rating, currency, maturity, and 
issue date. For each bond listed on one of the top ten exchanges other than Luxembourg, we 
define the bond’s yield premium relative to Luxembourg-listed bonds as: 
ܲݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉௜ ൌ ௜ܻ,௧,௠,௖,௥ை௧௛௘௥௦ െ ܻ௧,௠,௖,௥௅௨௫  
where	 ௜ܻ,௧,௠,௖,௥ை௧௛௘௥௦  is the observed yield at issuance of bond i, issued in year t, with a maturity of m 
years, in currency c, by a sovereign with long-term foreign-currency credit rating r, and ܻ௧,௠,௖,௥௅௨௫  
is the average yield (weighted by principal amount) of all Luxembourg-listed bonds having the 
same issue year, maturity, currency, and sovereign credit-rating.  
We then estimate the following model with OLS regressions: 
ܲݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉௜ ൌ ߚଵܮܫܵܶܫܰܩ௜ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜ 
where the independent variables of interest LISTING are our indicator variables for the top listing 
jurisdictions other than London (which is set as the base jurisdiction here) and Luxembourg, and 
X is the same vector of controls as in the previous regressions. 
Table 8 reports the regression results. We run different specifications (year fixed effects, 
issuer fixed effects, and issuer and year fixed effects), and use the full sample as well as sub-
samples for recent decades and for euro and dollar issuances. Once again, we observe significant 
coefficients only for jurisdictions (such as Germany and Switzerland) that were historically 
important but do not currently attract sovereign listings, with the surprising exception of 
Singapore. Overall, we fail to find a consistent yield premium or penalty associated with the 
major exchanges, particularly for the current decade, thus confirming the results of Tables 5 
through 8.  
 
4.3 Discussion of Results 
Overall, we find no consistent evidence that a sovereign bond’s listing jurisdiction affects 
the yield at issuance. This result should be qualified in several respects, however. First, our 
modeling choice and reliance on observational data raise concerns about endogeneity that could 
bias the regression results. If listing plays a bonding role, it serves as a signal with respect to 
credit risk that is otherwise unobservable by investors. It could be, however, that an issuer’s 
choice of listing jurisdiction is also motivated by components of credit risk already known to 
investors—and therefore already incorporated into yield—which would render the indicator 
21 
 
variables for the bonds’ listing jurisdiction endogenous. If it were the case that issuers’ 
observable credit risk drove listings, however, we might expect at least some instances of issuers 
shifting their listing jurisdiction to occur contemporaneously with changes in such issuers’ credit 
rating. We were unable to identify any such synchrony in the data, even accounting for inertia 
and delay. Nonetheless, we cannot rule of the potential for endogeneity in the model.13 
The second qualification relates to the implication of our results for the bonding 
hypothesis. Because we consider only differences among the exchanges, as opposed to 
differences between listed and unlisted bonds, the absence of an association between yield and 
listing jurisdiction could be explained in one of two ways: (1) listing does not perform any 
bonding function; or (2) listing does provide bonding, but all of the top exchanges provide the 
same level of bonding. There are several reasons to reject the second proposition in favor of the 
first.  
First, we reviewed the listing requirements applicable to sovereign-debt issuers in each of 
the top ten listing jurisdictions. While it is true that the exchanges differ very little today in their 
listing requirements for sovereign debt, this is precisely because they effectively impose only 
trivial requirements (summarized in Table 9 for the top five exchanges). None of the 
jurisdictions that we considered imposes material continuing disclosure requirements on 
sovereign issuers, in marked contrast to requirements for corporate equity issuers, for example. 
Further, the stated requirements for initial disclosure, if any, are largely misleading. The 
European exchanges, for example, require non-EEA issuers to provide a prospectus satisfying 
the EU’s Prospectus Directive. Putting aside that the Directive’s substantive requirements are 
minimal for sovereign issuers, a prospectus compliant with the Directive is required for any 
public offering to EU residents, regardless of where such bonds are listed. In other words, 
sovereigns listing on the Singapore Exchange are equally subject to the EU Prospectus Directive 
if any of their bonds will be offered to EU residents. 
Second, the top exchanges’ listing fees for sovereign debt issuances are also inconsistent 
with a bonding story. The listing fees for the top five listing jurisdictions (also reported in Table 
                                                     
13 In theory, selection effects could also bias the results, in that sovereign issuances are non-random. Most 
sovereigns seek to time the markets by issuing only when yields are low, whereas the highest-quality 
sovereigns pre-commit to issuing on a fixed schedule. In practice, however, our regression sample 
includes only the former category of sovereigns, and this group should be uniformly affected by any such 
selection bias. 
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9), for example, do not exceed US$20,000 in aggregate for sovereign debt, and most are well 
below this. Such amounts pale in comparison to the typical fees paid to the underwriters and 
credit rating agencies, rendering the notion that such exchanges provide unique screening and 
monitoring services largely implausible.14  
Third, in reviewing data provided by the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, we were unable 
to find a single instance of a bond being delisted as a result of a payment default or violation of a 
listing standard among the 2,180 unique sovereign-debt issuances listed there since 1945, which 
one would anticipate if Luxembourg were committed to monitoring issuers. 
Fourth, we examined the effects of an exogenous shock that prompted several issuers to 
change their listing jurisdiction, absent any change in credit risk. When the EU’s Prospectus 
Directive (2003/71/EC) came into effect in 2005, it applied uniformly to all public offerings in 
the EU, regardless of listing jurisdiction. Thus, the impact (if any) on bonding would have been 
the same for all exchanges in the EU. Nonetheless, we find that seven of the forty-eight 
sovereigns with bonds listed in Luxembourg at the time (Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Israel, 
Sweden, Ukraine, and Uruguay) shifted their listings to London or Dublin during the transition 
period—an abnormally high rate of change. According to our panel of sovereign-debt lawyers, 
the Luxembourg Stock Exchange was uncharacteristically slow to implement the requirements of 
the Prospectus Directive relative to London and Dublin. This suggests that, contrary to the 
bonding hypothesis, the speed of getting to market is a major motivation for selecting and 
switching exchanges. In fact, two countries (Croatia and Uruguay) eventually switched back to 
Luxembourg after the Directive was fully implemented. 
Finally, if the fact of listing and the precise listing jurisdiction were important to 
sovereign-bond investors, we would expect bond contracts to reflect this. Instead, we were 
unable to identify a single prospectus in our sample in which the issuer’s failure to obtain or 
maintain an exchange listing constituted an event of default. To be sure, sovereign-bond 
prospectuses routinely state that the issuer has applied to list the bonds on a particular exchange, 
which can be viewed as an implicit promise to list. Yet in the absence of any related covenants or 
                                                     
14 In the same vein, the Singapore Exchange and the Irish Stock Exchange both prominently market their 
swift review periods for debt listing applications (of one and three business days, respectively).  
http://www.sgx.com/wps/portal/sgxweb/home/listings/listing-debt-securities; http://www.ise.ie/Products-
Services/Listing-Debt/; (last visited, Oct. 10, 2016). 
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events of default in the bond indenture, there is no penalty whatsoever for failure to do so, and 
nothing prevents the issuer from either switching exchanges or delisting entirely. 
We therefore conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support the bonding 
hypothesis in this market: investors today do not appear to reward or punish sovereigns for their 
choice of securities exchange. 
 
5. Alternative Hypotheses 
If the bonding hypothesis does not hold, then the listing puzzle remains: why do most 
sovereigns choose to list their international bonds on a stock exchange, and how do they select 
from among the available jurisdictions? If listing on an exchange does not increase an issuer’s 
credibility with investors, why go to the trouble? While listing fees alone are often negligible, the 
need to involve lawyers, listing agents, and bankers renders the process costly in terms of both 
time and expense. Yet as a general matter, there is no legal requirement for sovereigns to list on 
an exchange in order to sell their bonds internationally. In this section, we briefly address some 
possible explanations for the listing puzzle. 
To this end, we contacted senior lawyers at every one of the twelve New York- and 
London-based law firms with a significant share of international sovereign-debt transactions (as 
reported in Bradley et al., 2014). Our sample of 53 individuals was taken from the list of elite 
lawyers who participated in the recent (2011-2015) efforts lead by the IMF, the ICMA 
(International Capital Markets Association) and the Bank of England to reform sovereign-debt 
contract provisions. We sent each individual an email containing Figure 3 as an attachment and 
asking for their reaction to the charted listing patterns, as well as their explanation for why 
sovereigns list and where they do so. We received substantive responses from 44 individuals, for 
an overall response rate of 83%.  
Most notably, not a single respondent mentioned bonding or credibility as an explanation 
for sovereign-bond listings. Instead, the responses were virtually unanimous in describing the 
task of obtaining an exchange listing for an international bond issuance as a “check-the-box” 
item and in pointing to the speed and ease of the listing process as the crucial differentiator 
between the exchanges. The following response was typical:  
“Investors generally do not care where [sovereign bonds] are listed, as long as they are 
listed somewhere.  Since it is a box-checking point for investors, and issuers know this, 
issuers have begun to look for even easier and less costly places to list.”   
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Yet noting that investors expect sovereign issuers to list begs the question. What, then, is the 
purpose of listing sovereign bonds? We discuss three possibilities below: (1) inertia; (2) advisor 
agency costs; and (3) investor restrictions. 
 
5.1 Inertia 
 Both the decision to list on an exchange and sovereigns’ particular choice of exchange 
could in theory be the result of pure inertia. If stock exchanges historically added value as a 
bonding mechanism for issuers, perhaps issuers have been slow to recognize that they no longer 
do so and simply persist in the practice of obtaining a listing and with the same exchange that 
they have always used. After all, there is evidence of considerable stickiness or inertia with 
respect to various contractual terms in sovereign bonds (e.g., Gulati and Scott 2013). Yet inertia 
does not appear to be the driving force here. As Figure 1 shows, the most popular listing 
jurisdiction for sovereign issuers has changed several times in the post-World War II period, 
indicating that sovereigns’ choices, while perhaps slow to update, are not static. More 
importantly, the market-wide patterns of sovereign listings mask a considerable degree of 
mobility at the level of the individual issuer. In particular, the period of multi-listing in the 1990s 
reveals that individual issuers consciously decide both whether to list and where, rather than 
simply persisting in their historical choices, and at times they switch frequently among 
exchanges.    
 In addition, the detailed responses that we received from top lawyers suggest that they 
regularly engage in thoughtful consideration of the merits of using one exchange over the other 
and do not feel bound to any one. Several mentioned having switched exchanges on short notice 
due to slow response times from one exchange’s staff. In sum, Luxembourg’s dominant market 
share for sovereign debt likely reflects neither pure inertia nor some unspecified network effect, 
but rather the fact that Luxembourg has consistently provided a speedy, easy, and predictable 
listing process for sovereigns over the past thirty years.15 
 
5.2 Advisor Agency Costs 
                                                     
15 Indeed, Ireland is reportedly drawing away market share from Luxembourg precisely by competing 
directly on those three characteristics. 
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A second hypothesis is that exchange listings reflect a small agency cost or collective 
action problem on the part of the lawyers or underwriters that advise sovereign debt issuers and 
who, in practice, select an exchange for the offering. Recall that not one of the lawyers in our 
sample suggested that exchange listings increase sovereigns’ credibility vis-à-vis the institutional 
investors that purchase sovereign bonds, and yet they persist in advising their clients to list. One 
possibility is that obtaining exchange listings amounts to a simple, verifiable task to justify their 
fees to clients. The legal fees involved are unlikely to be significant, however—perhaps no more 
than a few thousand dollars’ worth of a junior associate’s time. While we have seen no evidence 
that advisor agency costs drive listing choices, the hypothesis remains to be explored. A more 
benign possibility is that, even if they suspect that exchange listings offer no value, they are 
unwilling to deviate out of risk aversion. Law firms have little incentive to be the first-mover in 
testing the value of listing.  
 
5.3 Investment Restrictions 
While the bonding hypothesis dominates the recent literature on cross-listing, a second 
explanation often given for exchange listings is liquidity. A stock exchange gathers vast numbers 
of buyers and sellers, thus allowing issuers to raise capital at relatively low cost from the many 
investors that use the exchange. In the cross-border context, the liquidity or market segmentation 
hypothesis suggests further that foreign firms can access local investors in a particular 
jurisdiction more cheaply by listing on a major stock exchange in that jurisdiction, due to 
regulatory restrictions and other information and transaction costs that hinder foreign investment 
(Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977; Errunza and Losq, 1985). Perhaps, then, sovereign issuers 
list abroad in order to target investors in particular jurisdictions and to access the liquidity 
afforded by the major global exchanges.   
Such exchanges cannot truly provide liquidity for international sovereign bonds, 
however, for the simple reason that most such bonds do not trade on the exchanges themselves. 
Rather, virtually all international sovereign debt is traded over-the-counter directly between 
financial institutions. Nor do stock-exchange listings help with price-discovery for sovereign 
bonds, for the very same reason. The share of international sovereign bonds that is actually 
traded on the exchanges is too small to serve as a public price signal for the remainder of the 
26 
 
market; instead, sovereign-bond traders can simply refer to their Bloomberg terminals for recent 
quotes from dealers. 
There is a different sense, however, in which listing on an exchange might provide 
sovereigns with greater liquidity. There is a mantra in the sovereign-debt industry—often 
repeated by the exchanges themselves—that certain institutional investors such as pension funds 
or insurance companies are constrained by law or by internal policy to invest some portion of 
their assets in listed securities.16 In fact, this was the explanation most frequently cited by our 
sample of experts for sovereigns’ decision to list. In order to access such investors, sovereigns 
are prompted to list, even or especially in jurisdictions with no meaningful listing standards, in a 
form of regulatory arbitrage. If applicable on a large scale, investment restrictions of this sort 
could account for the seeming “race to the bottom” in listing requirements that we observe 
among the most popular listing jurisdictions, with the exchanges competing to offer the fastest, 
least restrictive approval process.17 On this point, the following reaction from a lawyer in our 
sample was typical:  
“The norm is that one needs a foreign listing – but no one seems to care that much where  
it is.  The key is that the location has to be quick and easy—and also cheap.”  
 
Another described Luxembourg’s marketing pitch to sovereign issuers as boiling down to 
“[c]heap and easy.”   
We note two remarkable features of this rationale for exchange listings, however. First, in 
the absence of any bonding benefits, laws or policies confining institutional investors to listed 
securities fail to serve any obvious purpose. Such requirements lack substance even on their face: 
as described, they are not limited to exchanges located in specific jurisdictions or meeting 
specific standards. The implication is that, if they exist, such investment restrictions reflect either 
poorly designed regulation or voluntary investment policies that may give retail investors a false 
sense of security.   
                                                     
16 Arthur Cox, a listing agent for the Irish Stock Exchange, reports that “many” institutional investors “are 
required to hold at least 90% of their investments in listed securities.” http://www.arthurcox.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Arthur-Cox-Listing-Services-Specialist-Debt-Securities-June-2013.pdf (last 
visited October 10, 2016). 
17 In contrast, proponents of the bonding hypothesis in the cross-listing literature have modeled the 
evolution of the major securities exchanges as a “race to the top,” with the exchanges competing by 
increasing their disclosure requirements, for example (Huddart et al., 1999; Coffee, 1999).  
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Second, although our respondents frequently referred to such investment restrictions as 
an explanation for sovereigns’ listing practices, they did not identify any specific instances, and 
we have found very few. (Table 10 provides a small sample from across the globe.) Moreover, 
examples of such restrictions reported by listing agents or in the press commonly prove to be 
inapplicable, whether because they are no longer in effect; they apply solely to corporate 
securities; or they require listing on the issuer’s domestic exchange, rather than on any foreign 
exchange.18 This raises the possibility that the entire practice of sovereign debt listings rests on 
what is largely a false belief. And yet, as one of our respondents explained, even if such 
restrictions do not actually exist, it may nonetheless be rational for an individual sovereign to 
obtain a listing: as long as market participants believe (as they appear to do) that such restrictions 
exist, a sovereign that fails to obtain an exchange-listing may be penalized with a higher yield for 
passing up the additional liquidity. In the absence of an external change, therefore, sovereign 
listings may therefore persist for some time to come.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Our dataset brings to the fore several facts about sovereigns’ decision to list their bonds 
on a foreign securities exchange. First, the patterns of where sovereigns choose to list have 
shifted in waves since World War II. In particular, New York’s dominance in the immediate 
post-War period eventually gave way to Luxembourg, which has been the overwhelming favorite 
among sovereign issuers for the past thirty years. Second, other than for the most elite issuers, 
the practice of listing international sovereign bonds on a foreign exchange persists to this day, 
despite the fact that barriers to cross-border investment are generally thought to be declining and 
trading in sovereign bonds has moved almost entirely off the exchanges. Third, similarly to the 
pattern for cross-listings in the U.S. by foreign firms, the practice of listing sovereign bonds on 
multiple exchanges gained in popularity in the 1990s, but has since fallen out of favor, 
suggesting that it does not yield measurable benefits for issuers today. 
The most frequent academic explanation for listing securities on a foreign exchange, the 
bonding hypothesis, no longer appears to apply in today’s sovereign debt markets. Sovereign 
issuers of all credit quality have gravitated en masse toward permissive jurisdictions such as 
                                                     
18 Similarly, the provisions in Table 10 relating to withholding taxes are superfluous for sovereign debt, 
as opposed to corporate debt. Withholding taxes only apply in such jurisdictions to domestically-sourced 
income, which would not be the case for interest on debt issued by foreign sovereigns.   
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Luxembourg, London, Ireland, and Singapore, which impose minimal listing requirements on 
sovereign issuers today. Using our sample of post-World War II international sovereign bonds, 
we test whether the bonding hypothesis holds in the sovereign-debt market, by examining 
whether the specific choice of listing jurisdiction affects a bond’s yield at issuance. We find little 
evidence of such an effect today, and conclude that the major stock exchanges no longer perform 
screening or monitoring roles for sovereign issuances. 
Why, then, do most sovereigns choose to list on foreign stock exchanges? The most 
frequent explanation from market participants is that institutional investors in some jurisdictions 
may be required to maintain a specified percentage of their investments in listed securities—on 
any international exchange. Such investment restrictions are increasingly rare in practice, 
however, and their application to sovereign bonds is puzzling, given the lack of observed 
bonding effects from sovereign listings.     
At bottom, we see little evidence that exchange listing adds value to sovereign debt 
issuances. If that is so, then the costs associated with obtaining an exchange listing represent a 
net social-welfare loss. Why does this matter? While the cost of listing on an exchange is 
relatively small for each issuance, it is surely significant when aggregated over the thousands of 
sovereign and sub-sovereign offerings over time and around the globe.19 With sovereign bonds 
now traded almost exclusively over the counter, the ties between sovereign issuers and the major 
securities exchanges are increasingly tenuous. The market may need a final push to sever them.20 
  
                                                     
19 As a crude approximation, we estimate such costs to be on the order of $1.65 billion for 2015 alone. 
(We estimate an average of $100,000 in direct expenses per listed issuance, including the listing fee and 
annual fees payable to the exchange, the cost of hiring a debt listing agent, and attorneys’ fees attributable 
to obtaining the listing.  This amount is then multiplied by 165 (the number of listed bond issuances in 
our sample in 2015) and then by 100, to approximate the set of sovereign bonds that are (1) issued by sub-
sovereigns (such as municipalities and government agencies) and supra-sovereigns, (2) guaranteed by 
sovereigns, or (3) issued under local law, all of which are absent or significantly underrepresented in our 
sample.  Indeed, international sovereign debt represents less than 6% of all sovereign debt issued (see the 
Bank for International Settlements, BIS Securities Statistics and Syndicated Loans), yet much of this 
“local” debt is also exchange-listed.      
20 As of the writing of this paper, the EU’s new Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) recently took effect (on 
July 3, 2016), imposing significant continuing disclosure obligations on all financial instruments listed on 
exchanges in the EU, whether traded on “regulated” or “unregulated” (professional-only) markets.   
Because our evidence suggests that investors do not value mandatory disclosure requirements for 
sovereign issuers, we predict that, unless exemptions for sovereign issuers are introduced, this new 
regulatory regime could provide sufficient impetus for another market-wide shift in listing patterns, with 
sovereigns either moving to different jurisdictions such as Singapore or foregoing listing entirely.  
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Table 1: Dependent variable: summary statistics 
   
Bonds Mean. Median SD Min Max
Yield at issuances in %
Luxembourg 1861 7.2 7.0 2.9 0.4 19.3
Germany 523 7.6 7.6 2.1 0.3 16.0
London 415 6.5 6.4 3.2 0.1 18.5
Switzerland 160 7.2 6.9 2.5 2.8 15.6
New York 199 4.8 4.8 1.6 1.3 8.4
Tokyo 152 7.1 7.0 1.3 3.5 9.4
Paris 79 5.5 5.0 2.3 0.3 10.5
Singapore 71 6.0 6.0 1.7 2.1 11.6
Dublin 53 6.5 6.4 1.7 2.8 10.8
Hong Kong 39 6.2 6.5 2.1 1.9 10.9
Overall 3704 7.0 6.9 2.7 0.1 19.3
Spreads in % (over Treasury rate)
Luxembourg 1720 2.0 1.7 2.5 -6.3 14.0
Germany 379 0.4 0.4 3.1 -5.3 10.5
London 378 0.8 0.6 2.0 -6.5 8.9
Switzerland 60 1.2 1.0 1.3 -1.8 5.4
New York 118 -2.1 -1.9 2.1 -7.4 3.1
Tokyo 138 -2.1 -2.0 1.9 -6.4 2.0
Paris 76 -0.1 -0.3 1.2 -2.7 2.9
Singapore 60 2.2 2.2 2.1 -2.7 8.0
Dublin 52 3.9 3.9 2.2 0.2 8.4
Hong Kong 36 0.8 0.6 1.2 -3.3 3.4
Overall 3160 1.2 1.0 2.7 -7.4 14.0
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Table 2: Distribution of control variables 
 
Lux-
embourg
Ger-
many
Lon-don Switzer-
land
New 
York
Tokyo Paris Singa-
pore
Dublin Hong 
Kong
Ratings
AAA 307 175 166 55 67 10 35 0 0 0
AA 488 86 181 4 42 15 44 17 0 18
A 191 16 27 2 23 5 0 9 0 0
BBB 336 40 39 3 10 19 1 7 6 20
BB 510 73 25 7 8 6 4 34 18 7
B 257 50 25 7 0 0 0 15 26 0
CCC 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
CC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2096 440 463 78 150 55 84 82 52 45
na 84 131 40 93 57 97 3 2 1 6
Governing law
England 1005 422 38 24 5 50 21 16 0 10
France 18 0 0 0 0 0 28 1 0 3
Germany 38 1 346 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 152 0
Luxembourg 34 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Netherlands 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Jersey 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New York 838 36 10 2 67 2 0 63 0 33
Portugal 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Switzerland 2 0 0 87 0 0 0 0 0 0
local 201 29 34 14 0 0 38 1 0 2
Total 2141 489 434 127 72 52 87 83 152 51
na 39 14 137 80 99 1 0 1 0 0
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Lux-
embourg
Ger-
many
Lon-
don
Switzer-
land
New 
York
Tokyo Paris Singa-
pore
Dublin Hong 
Kong
Currency
AED 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ATS 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AUD 12 0 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
BRL 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CAD 18 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHF 5 0 0 0 206 0 0 0 0 0
CLP 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CNY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
COP 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CZK 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DEM 31 469 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
DKK 14 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DRC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EGP 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EUR 529 95 68 2 0 0 43 5 10 4
FRF 25 0 5 0 0 0 44 1 0 3
GBP 45 0 75 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
GRD 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HRK 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HUF 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ISK 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ITL 39 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
JPY 88 0 36 0 0 73 0 3 0 1
LTL 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LUF 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MXN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NLG 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NOK 12 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NZD 6 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PHP 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PLN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PTE 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RON 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RUB 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SEK 3 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SKK 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TRY 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
USD 1244 7 247 167 1 0 0 73 43 42
UYU 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yen 0 0 0 0 0 79 0 0 0 0
ZAR 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2180 571 503 171 207 152 87 84 53 51
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Table 3: Stock exchanges: number of sovereign bond issuances, 1945-2015 
  
  
Stock Exchange Total Mean per 
year 
Maximum 
per year
Date of 
Maximum 
Luxembourg 2180 31.1 133 1999
Germany (comb.) 571 8.2 37 1996
London 503 7.2 38 1993
Switzerland (comb.) 207 3.0 10 1979
New York 171 2.4 15 1977
Tokyo 152 2.2 19 1978
Paris 87 1.2 8 1997
Singapore 84 1.2 14 1994
Dublin 53 0.8 11 2014
Hong Kong 51 0.7 18 1994
Amsterdam 42 0.6 6 1997
Milan 39 0.6 20 1999
Madrid 32 0.5 15 1997
Vienna 14 0.2 3 1994
Bangkok 11 0.2 5 2015
Dubai 10 0.1 2 2015
Copenhagen 5 0.1 2 1996
Kuala Lumpur 4 0.1 3 2015
Buenos Aires 3 0.0 2 1995
Lisbon 2 0.0 1 1994
Oslo 2 0.0 1 1985
Kuwait 1 0.0 1 1987
Moscow 1 0.0 1 2010
Quito 1 0.0 1 2012
Overall 4226 60.4 198 1999
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Table 4: Countries: number of bond issuances, 1945-2015 
   
Country Freq Country Freq Country Freq.
Austria 349 Israel 17 Cuba 3
Sweden 337 Thailand 17 Gabon 3
Denmark 271 Cyprus 15 Macedonia 3
Italy 216 Czech Republic 14 Mongolia 3
Finland 202 South Korea 14 Nigeria 3
Argentina 200 Dominican Republic 13 Paraguay 3
Turkey 162 El Salvador 13 Senegal 3
Brazil 125 Slovenia 13 United Kingdom 3
Hungary 119 Tunisia 13 Zambia 3
Mexico 118 Morocco 12 Albania 2
Belgium 111 Kazakhstan 11 Algeria 2
Greece 108 Laos 11 Angola 2
Ireland 107 Pakistan 11 Bosnia and Herzeg. 2
New Zealand 107 Bahrain 10 Congo 2
Australia 94 Bulgaria 10 Georgia 2
Portugal 92 Qatar 10 Grenada 2
Colombia 84 Sri Lanka 10 Iran 2
Lebanon 77 Trinidad and Tobago 9 Jordan 2
Philippines 76 Barbados 8 Namibia 2
Poland 69 Ecuador 8 Netherlands 2
Venezuela 68 Egypt 8 Qatar Suku 2
Spain 63 Latvia 8 Seychelles 2
South Africa 60 Dubai Suku 7 Armenia 1
Norway 56 Indonesia Suku 7 Azerbaijan 1
Canada 48 Japan 7 Bolivia 1
Uruguay 44 Yugoslavia 7 Cameroon 1
Malaysia 42 Hong Kong Suku 6 Cote d'Ivoire 1
China 39 Malaysia Suku 6 Czechoslovakia 1
Indonesia 38 Montenegro 5 Dem. Rep. of Congo 1
Iceland 37 Singapore 5 Estonia 1
Panama 37 Aruba 4 Ethiopia 1
Lithuania 34 Belarus 4 Fiji 1
Ukraine 32 Belize 4 Gibraltar 1
Slovak Republic 27 Ghana 4 Honduras 1
Jamaica 26 Guatemala 4 Liechtenstein 1
Russia 26 Kenya 4 Mauritius 1
Croatia 24 United Arab Emirates 4 Moldova 1
Romania 24 United States 4 Oman 1
Costa Rica 23 Vietnam 4 Rwanda 1
Peru 21 Bahamas 3 Turkey Suku 1
Chile 18
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Table 5: OLS results: full sample, 1986-2015 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Spreads Spreads Spreads Spreads Spreads Spreads Spreads
Listing places (base: Luxembourg)
Germany -1.55*** -0.86*** -0.59*** 0.05 -0.23 0.05 -0.14
(0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21)
London -1.14*** -1.18*** -0.28** -0.08 -0.14 -0.01 0.08
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.19)
Switzerland -4.06*** -3.84*** -2.44*** -0.60 -0.43 -0.53 -0.67*
(0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.50) (0.51) (0.42) (0.37)
New York -0.79*** -0.42 -0.48 -0.29 -0.27 -0.29 -0.30
(0.17) (0.40) (0.29) (0.22) (0.30) (0.22) (0.40)
Tokyo -4.04*** -3.41*** -2.65*** 2.45*** 2.77***
(0.17) (0.23) (0.21) (0.50) (0.59)
Paris -2.08*** -2.12*** -0.40** -0.26 -0.51** -0.20 0.00
(0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.23)
Singapore 0.26 0.26 -0.27 -0.33** 0.32* -0.33** 0.70**
(0.28) (0.28) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.34)
Dublin 1.93*** 1.98*** 0.35 0.40 -0.64* 0.44* -0.18
(0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.26) (0.34) (0.25) (0.33)
Hong Kong -1.18*** -1.24*** -0.77*** -0.71*** -0.38 -0.51*** -0.34
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.24) (0.19) (0.54)
Tenor 0.01 -0.03*** -0.01* -0.02*** -0.00 -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.17*** -0.25*** 0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.14***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
0.28* 0.42*** 0.90*** 0.79*** 0.85*** 0.24
(0.15) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.17)
Constant 1.97*** 4.65*** 4.62*** -3.76*** -1.23 -0.31 9.85***
(0.06) (1.11) (1.14) (0.95) (1.28) (1.06) (1.49)
Observations 3,017 2,580 2,450 2,430 2,430 2,430 1,588
R-squared 0.204 0.162 0.495 0.711 0.750 0.749 0.821
Test for all listing dummies=0 116.9 86.78 40.00 5.512 4.235 2.278 1.241
p-value 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.271
Country fixed effects No No No No Yes No Yes
Year fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Comments includes 
dummies for 
ratings
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Amount issued in USD (log)
Lagged CBOE Volatility Index
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Table 6: OLS results: subsample, by decade 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1980-1989 1980-1989 1990-1999 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2015
Spreads Spreads Spreads Spreads Spreads Spreads
Listing places (base: Luxembourg)
Germany -0.24 -0.26 -0.31 -0.77
(0.35) (0.32) (0.23) (0.68)
London -0.09 -0.20 -0.35* -0.30* 0.11 0.50
(0.41) (0.39) (0.19) (0.17) (0.22) (0.58)
Switzerland -1.25*** -1.69*** -0.21 -0.50 -0.55
(0.36) (0.39) (0.48) (0.49) (0.44)
New York -0.39 -0.36
(0.39) (0.36)
Tokyo 0.01 -1.27 5.89*** 4.96***
(1.48) (1.54) (1.10) (0.78)
Paris -1.00 -0.79 -1.07*** -0.89*** 0.15 -0.66
(0.81) (0.83) (0.29) (0.25) (0.27) (0.68)
Singapore -0.37 -0.05 0.96* -0.68
(0.23) (0.28) (0.50) (0.68)
Dublin -1.30*** 0.60
(0.36) (0.52)
Hong Kong -0.74*** -0.46*
(0.27) (0.25)
Tenor -0.02 -0.02 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.03*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.16*** -0.18***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
-0.69* 0.28 -0.37 0.51 0.90*** 0.95***
(0.37) (0.49) (0.23) (0.37) (0.21) (0.26)
Constant 1.55 -3.42 1.47 0.24 3.92*** 9.21***
(5.71) (5.51) (1.88) (1.99) (1.48) (1.94)
Observations 189 189 827 827 859 464
R-squared 0.825 0.840 0.755 0.797 0.861 0.903
Test for all listing dummies=03.417 4.963 6.465 7.130 3.570 0.813
p-value 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.541
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Comments includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law & 
currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law & 
currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law & 
currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  governing 
law & currency 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Amount issued in USD (log)
Lagged CBOE Volatility 
Index
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Table 7: OLS results: subsample, USD- and EUR-denominated bonds only 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample 2010-2015
Spreads Spreads Spreads Spreads Spreads
Listing places (base: Luxembourg)
Germany 0.31 0.21 -0.01 -0.08 -0.75
(0.31) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.71)
London -0.98*** 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.48
(0.14) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) (0.57)
Switzerland
Tokyo
New York -1.00*** -0.48** -0.45* -0.21
(0.16) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23)
Paris -2.72*** 0.12 -0.14 -0.16 -0.68
(0.14) (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.71)
Singapore 0.19 -0.31* 0.39** 0.43** -3.27***
(0.26) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.96)
Dublin 1.79*** 0.60** 0.09 -0.02 0.58
(0.30) (0.25) (0.31) (0.30) (0.52)
Hong Kong -1.33*** -0.75*** -0.46* -0.43*
(0.21) (0.21) (0.28) (0.25)
Tenor -0.00 -0.01* -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.02 0.01 -0.08* -0.17**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
1.42*** 1.33*** 1.03*** 0.97***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.27)
Constant 2.15*** -9.14*** -7.49*** -4.21*** 4.81**
(0.06) (0.77) (1.24) (1.21) (1.93)
Observations 1,906 1,653 1,653 1,653 436
R-squared 0.085 0.678 0.741 0.768 0.900
Test for all listing dummies=0 73.04 4.052 2.154 1.989 3.964
p-value 0 0.000 0.036 0.053 0.002
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Comments includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law & 
currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law & 
currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  governing 
law & currency 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Amount issued in USD (log)
Lagged CBOE Volatility Index
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Table 8: OLS results: yield premium as dependent variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Sample Total Sample Total Sample Total Sample 2010-2015 2010-2015
USD & EUR 
bonds
Premium Premium Premium Premium Premium Premium
Listing places (base: London)
Germany 1.68 -0.07 3.53*** -2.56*
(1.06) (0.64) (0.48) (1.39)
Switzerland -1.21 -0.65 -1.78* -2.58*
(0.77) (1.00) (0.93) (1.31)
New York
Tokyo
Paris
Singapore 3.31** 6.50*** 9.30*** -3.01*** -3.01***
(1.38) (1.06) (1.77) (0.76) (0.76)
Dublin -2.08* -2.42 -2.42
(1.05) (1.62) (1.62)
Hong Kong
Tenor 0.05** 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
0.13 -0.09 0.19 -0.14 0.14 0.14
(0.15) (0.18) (0.16) (0.26) (0.48) (0.48)
-0.35 0.24 -0.44 0.22 -2.37 -2.37
(0.29) (0.55) (0.30) (0.64) (1.44) (1.44)
Constant -6.14** -4.46 -7.18* -1.34 5.72 5.72
(2.96) (3.73) (3.76) (5.78) (11.04) (11.04)
Observations 106 106 106 106 56 56
R-squared 0.758 0.893 0.841 0.913 0.870 0.870
Test for all listing dummies=0 2.962 0.255 20.14 2.607 8.383 8.383
p-value 0.058 0.776 0.000 0.086 0.002 0.002
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No No
Comments includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
includes 
dummies for 
rating,  
governing law 
& currency 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Amount issued in USD (log)
Lagged CBOE Volatility Index
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Table 9: Summary of selected exchanges’ material listing requirements for sovereign debt 
 Key Listing Requirements (Summary) 
 
Listing Fees Other 
Luxembourg 
Stock Exchange 
 Prospectus compliant with provisions of EU Prospectus 
Directive21 applicable to sovereign issuers,22 including: 
o risk factors 
o terms and conditions of the securities 
o summary information about the sovereign state 
o description of the tax and budgetary system, the 
gross public debt, foreign trade and balance of 
payment figures and foreign exchange reserves for 
the previous two fiscal years (and significant changes 
since the end of the fiscal year), and  
o details of legal and arbitration proceedings in the 
previous year 
 Exceptions: No prospectus required if 
o Securities will be offered only to professionals (the 
“unregulated” market) 
o Sovereign is a member of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) 
 Covenant that the debt securities are freely transferable 
 
  
 Visa fee: €2,000 
 Listing fee: €600-€2,000 
 Annual fee: €440-€800 
 Requires 
appointment of 
listing agent to 
facilitate 
application process 
 
London Stock 
Exchange 
 Same as for Luxembourg Stock Exchange 
 
 Admission fee of up to 
£4,200 
 No annual fee 
 
 
Irish Stock 
Exchange 
 Same as for Luxembourg Stock Exchange 
 
 Document Fees: €4,500   
 Formal Notice Fee: €440 
 Annual Fee: €2,000 
 Guaranteed three-
day first review 
 Requires 
                                                     
21 Note that such a Prospectus is required under EU law for all public offerings of securities in the EU, regardless of whether and where the 
securities are listed.   
22 Annex XVI of EC Regulation 809/2004. 
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 Key Listing Requirements (Summary) 
 
Listing Fees Other 
 appointment of 
listing agent to 
facilitate approval 
process 
 
Singapore 
Exchange 
 Appointment of local paying agent (but may be waived by 
the exchange) 
 Prospectus containing the principal terms and conditions the 
of issue 
 Exception: If the debt securities are offered without a 
prospectus and primarily to specified investors, the offering 
memorandum or introductory document need only contain 
“the information that such investors would customarily 
expect to see in such documents.” 
 Ongoing disclosure to the Exchange of any information 
which may have a material effect on the price or value of its 
debt securities or on an investor’s decision whether to trade 
in such debt securities 
 
 Processing Fee: 
S$10,000 
 Listing Fee: S$15,000 
 No annual fee 
 One-business-day 
listing approval for 
wholesale debt 
securities (10 
business days for 
retail debt 
securities) 
Hong Kong 
Exchanges 
(HKEX) 
 Debt securities must be freely transferable with a 
denomination of at least HK$500,000 (or equivalent in other 
currencies). 
 Prospectus (“listing document”) to include: 
o Terms and conditions of the debt securities 
o Details of the organization and administration of the 
State 
o Description of economic situation of the State 
o Summary finances (income, expenditures, budget 
forecast, and public debt) for the past 2 years 
 Exception: If securities are offered only to professionals, 
prospectus need only contain “the information that the 
investors an issuer is offering the securities to would 
customarily expect it to contain.”) 
 
 Listing fee ranging from 
HK$10,000 to 
HK$90,000 depending 
on maturity and size of 
issuance 
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Table 10: Examples of investment restrictions and tax provisions tied to listed securities 
 
Jurisdiction Law/Investment Restriction 
 
  
Australiaa Eurobonds listed on “approved stock exchanges” are automatically 
exempt from withholding taxes.  
  
Estonia* Pension funds are subject to 10% cap on unlisted bonds. 
  
Hong Kongb Mandatory provident fund schemes are permitted to invest in 
securities listed on “recognized stock exchanges.” 
  
Poland* Insurance companies are subject to 40% cap on unlisted securities 
and units in investment funds. 
  
Qatarc Banks are subject to a variable cap on investments in unlisted 
securities abroad. 
  
Slovenia* Pension funds are subject to 10% cap on unlisted stocks and bonds. 
  
United Kingdomd Pension funds and individual retirement accounts are permitted to 
hold securities listed on “recognized stock exchanges.” Eurobonds 
listed on such exchanges are explicitly exempt from withholding 
tax. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* OECD, Annual Survey of Investment Regulation of Pension Funds, 2014; OECD, Regulation of 
Insurance Company and Pension Fund Investment, OECD Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, September 2015. 
a  Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. 
b Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority, 2016, Section 2 of the Mandatory Provident Fund 
Schemes (General) Regulation.  
c   http://www.reuters.com/article/qatar-banks-investment-idUSL5N0ES06120130616, 
https://www.ft.com/content/3660e5d2-d8c1-11e2-a6cf-00144feab7de (last visited October 31, 2016). 
d Income Tax Act 2007, supplemented by the Qualifying Private Placement Regulations 2015 (SI 
2015/2002) 
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Table 11: Overview of sources  
Variables Sources 
 
  
S & P ratings Standard and Poor’s Ratings Direct 
  
Currency, governing law, 
maturity, amount issued, 
coupon rate, issue price 
Dealogic DCM Analytics database, hand-coded bond 
prospectuses and offering circulars from Thomson One Banker and 
Perfect Information database, Deutsche Bundesbank (statistische 
Beihefte zum Monatsbericht, 1968-1981), Schweizerische 
Nationalbank (Monatsbericht, 1945-1983), Tokyo Shoken 
Torihikijo (Annual statistics reports 1973-1983) 
  
CBOE Volatility Index Bloomberg and CBOE 
  
US Treasury yields (daily, 
interpolated) 
Gurkaynak et al. (2016) 
  
Exchange rates LCU/USD World Development Indicators, OECD   
  
 
 
 
